Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 43
Issue 2 43:2 (2020) Special Issue: Labour Law

Article 12

12-2020

Responsible Scholarship in a Crisis: A Plea For Fairness in
Academic Discourse on Carbon Pricing References
Stepan Wood
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia

Meinhard Doelle
Dalhousie University, Schulich School of Law

Dayna N. Scott
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Legal Education Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Recommended Citation
Stepan Wood, Meinhard Doelle, and Dayna N. Scott, "Responsible Scholarship in a Crisis: A Plea For
Fairness in Academic Discourse on Carbon Pricing References" (2020) 43:2 Dal LJ 929.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Stepan Wood*
Meinhard Doelle**
Dayna Nadine Scott***

Responsible Scholarship in a Crisis:
A Plea For Fairness in Academic
Discourse on Carbon Pricing References

This article offers a critical review of a paper Professor Dwight Newman recently
published on the constitutionality of the federal government’s national carbon pricing
legislation and the Saskatchewan and Ontario court decisions upholding the law. Rather
than engage with the substance of Professor Newman’s article, the authors consider
whether it respects the norms of rigorous and fair inquiry that enable constructive
scholarly debate. The authors conclude that it does not, and that the consequences
for the Supreme Court’s resolution of the carbon pricing reference cases could be
significant.
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relative à la tarification du carbone et des décisions des tribunaux de la Saskatchewan
et de l’Ontario confirmant la loi. Plutôt que de s’engager sur le fond de l’article du
professeur Newman, les auteurs examinent s’il respecte les normes d’une enquête
rigoureuse et équitable qui permettent un débat scientifique constructif. Les auteurs
concluent que ce n’est pas le cas, et que les conséquences pour la résolution par la
Cour suprême des affaires relatives au renvoi sur la tarification du carbone pourraient
être importantes.
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Introduction
Professor Dwight Newman recently published an article on the
constitutionality of the federal government’s national carbon pricing
legislation and the Saskatchewan and Ontario court decisions upholding
the law.1 The article was part of a rapidly growing academic literature on
the powers of Canadian governments to combat climate change. The vast
majority of this literature respects the norms of rigorous and fair inquiry
that enable constructive scholarly debate. It is important for legal scholars
to uphold these norms, especially in times of crisis such as the current
climate emergency. Unfortunately, the article in question did not, and the
consequences for the Supreme Court’s resolution of the carbon pricing
reference cases could be significant.
In Part I of this article we emphasize the importance of responsible
scholarship during times of crisis. We then discuss norms for responsible
conduct of scholarly inquiry applicable to Canadian legal academics in
Part II, with a focus on standards that demand scrupulous fairness to other
scholars and to the materials one is analyzing. In Part III we argue that
Professor Newman’s article does not live up to these standards in two
ways. First, it is unfair to other scholars because it distorts their work and
lumps them into derogatory, unsubstantiated general types. Second, it is
unfair to the legal materials because it portrays the relevant case law in an
unduly selective manner to advance the author’s argument. We conclude
with some reflections on why this particular case matters.
1.

Dwight Newman, “Federalism, Subsidiarity, and Carbon Taxes” (2019) 82:2 Sask L Rev 187.
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I. The importance of responsible scholarship during a crisis
The Canadian federal government’s enactment of legislation to put a
national price on carbon emissions2 unleashed a storm of controversy.
Three provinces challenged the law in court. Two Courts of Appeal—
in Saskatchewan and Ontario—upheld the legislation as intra vires the
federal government,3 while that of Alberta declared it unconstitutional.4
The Supreme Court of Canada was scheduled to hear appeals from the
Saskatchewan and Ontario decisions in March, 2020 when the COVID-19
pandemic intervened. Appeals from all three decisions were heard together
in September 2020.5
These legal developments are unfolding in the context of an
unprecedented crisis. Human activity, primarily in the form of burning
fossil fuels, is disrupting the climate system.6 Atmospheric concentrations
of carbon dioxide were last this high more than three million years ago,
at a time when sea levels and global average surface temperatures were
much higher than they are now.7 Climate change has already begun to
damage ecosystems, species, people and economies.8 The window of
opportunity to avoid catastrophic climate change is shrinking rapidly.9
2.
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, SC 2018, c 12.
3.
Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 SKCA 40 [Saskatchewan Reference];
Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2019 ONCA 544 [Ontario Reference].
4.
Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2020 ABCA 74 [Alberta Reference].
5.
Saskatchewan (AG) v Canada (AG), SCC Docket No 38663 [SK (AG)]; Ontario (AG) v Canada
(AG), SCC Docket No 38781 [ON (AG)]; British Columbia (AG) v Alberta (AG), SCC Docket No
39116 [BC (AG)].
6.
See eg World Meteorological Organization et al, United in Science: High-level Synthesis Report
of Latest Climate Science Information Convened by the Science Advisory Group of the UN Climate
Action Summit 2019 (Geneva: WMO, 2019); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate
Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva: IPCC, 2014).
7.
AM Haywood et al, “Large-Scale Features of Pliocene Climate: Results from the Pliocene Model
Intercomparison Project” (2013) 9:1 Climate of the Past 191 at 192; KD Burke et al, “Pliocene and
Eocene Provide Best Analogs for Near-Future Climates” (2018) 115:52 Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 13288 at 13289.
8.
See eg Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in Climate
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge, 2014); FJ Warren & DS Lemmen, eds,
Canada in a Changing Climate: Sector Perspectives on Impacts and Adaptation (Ottawa: Government
of Canada, 2014).
9.
See eg Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Global Warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC
Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related
Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to
the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty (Geneva:
IPCC, 2018); Jonathan Watts, “We Have 12 Years to Limit Climate Change Catastrophe, Warns UN,”
The Guardian (8 October 2018), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/08/
global-warming-must-not-exceed-15c-warns-landmark-un-report> [https://perma.cc/W7Y9-6K9F].
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There is a growing consensus amongst governments and climate experts
that humanity is facing a climate emergency.10
The climate crisis intersects with other crises including biodiversity
loss, poverty, human migration, racist and colonial violence, and the
current public health crisis of COVID-19.
Crises can devastate communities and disrupt individual lives,11
causing competing worldviews, ideologies and interests to come into
conflict.12 In some crises, entrenched privileges, ingrained habits and
received wisdom are upended; in others, they are reinforced.13 Profits and
livelihoods are jeopardized for some, enriched for others.14 Both those
who benefit most from and those who are harmed most by the status quo
sometimes resort to extreme measures. Politics and public discourse can
get nasty, with social media amplifying extremism and misinformation.15
Academic researchers are not immune to these pressures. Nor should
we be. Scholars should and do contribute to public debate, influence public
policy, support their preferred movements and oppose others—in short,
engage fully in political and civic life. They have as much right as anyone
to feel and act upon the emotions elicited in a crisis.16 But when they engage
in scholarly research and writing, they should not relax the standards of
rigour and fairness that apply to these undertakings. They should resist
allowing the meanness and distortion that have infected contemporary
social media and populist political rhetoric to infect scholarly discourse.
Why? Because adherence to these norms of rigour and fairness is a big
part of what gives academic research its authority and legitimacy.17
10. As of 24 July 2020, 1,755 jurisdictions and local governments representing more than 820
million people had declared a climate emergency: Anon, “Climate Emergency Declarations
in 1,755 Jurisdictions and Local Governments Cover 820 Million Citizens,” online: <https://
climateemergencydeclaration.org/climate-emergency-declarations-cover-15-million-citizens/>
[https://perma.cc/2XE4-RQ4U].
11. Stefanie Haeffele & Virgil Henry Storr, “Introduction” in Stefanie Haeffele & Virgil Henry Storr,
eds, Government Responses to Crisis (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2020) 1 at 1.
12. See eg Christian Lahusen & Maria T Grasso, eds, Solidarity in Europe: Citizens’ Responses in
Times of Crisis (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018).
13. See eg Dorothea Hilhorst, “Disaster, Conflict and Society: Everyday Politics of Crisis Response”
in Dorothea Hilhorst, ed, Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises: Everyday Politics of Crisis Response
(London: Routledge, 2013) 1 at 5-7.
14. See eg Tatiana Beliaeva et al, “Benefiting from Economic Crisis? Strategic Orientation Effects,
Trade-Offs, and Configurations with Resource Availability on SME Performance” (2020) 16 Intl
Entrepreneurship & Management J 165.
15. See eg Thomas T Hills, “The Dark Side of Information Proliferation” (2019) 14:3 Perspectives
on Psychological Science 323.
16. On the importance of emotions in a crisis, see Hyo J Kim & Glen T Cameron, “Emotions Matter
in Crisis: The Role of Anger and Sadness in the Publics’ Response to Crisis News Framing and
Corporate Crisis Response” (2011) 38:6 Communication Research 826.
17. See eg David B Resnik, “Scientific Research and the Public Trust” (2011) 17:3 Science &
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Actors in government, civil society and business often appeal to
academic expertise to diagnose and resolve crises. They often rely on
academic scholarship to inform crucial decisions and rules, as we have
seen with many governments’ COVID-19 response measures18 and climate
change policies.19
This willingness to rely on scholarly expertise is based, in large part, on
scholars’ adherence to norms of responsible research conduct. Misplaced
reliance on such adherence can have real consequences. A leading text on
research ethics observes that people rely on research results “to form social
policy and to address practical problems” and that researchers therefore
“must strive to earn the public’s support and trust.”20 The authors continue:
“If research results are erroneous or unreliable, then people may be killed
or harmed, the environment may be degraded, money and resources may
be misused or wasted, and misguided laws or policies may be enacted.”21
A contemporary example will illustrate. In the spring of 2020,
the World Health Organization and several countries halted trials of
hydroxychloroquine for COVID-19 treatment after a study was published
in a leading medical journal reporting an elevated risk of heart disease
and death. The journal retracted the article22 after doubts were raised
about the data and the authors were unable to vouch for its accuracy. The
Engineering Ethics 399.
18. See eg John Dupré, “‘Following the Science’ in the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Nuffield Council
on Bioethics (29 April 2020), online (blog): <https://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/blog/following-thescience-in-the-covid-19-pandemic> [https://perma.cc/9J5L-ZFNF].
19. See eg Paris Agreement, 12 Dec 2015, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 Annex; Edward
A Morgan & Gabriela Marques Di Giulio, “Science and Evidence-Based Climate Change Policy:
Collaborative Approaches to Improve the Science–Policy Interface” in Silvia Serrao-Neumann, Anne
Coudrain & Liese Coulter, eds, Communicating Climate Change Information for Decision-Making
(Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018) 13.
20. Adil E Shamoo & David B Resnik, Responsible Conduct of Research, 2nd ed (New York:
Oxford, 2009) at 6.
21. Ibid at 6-7. While these observations were directed at scientific research, we believe they apply
to all research that is used to form social policy and address practical problems.
22. Mandeep R Mehra, Frank Ruschitzka & Amit N Patel, “Retraction—Hydroxychloroquine or
Chloroquine With or Without a Macrolide for Treatment of COVID-19: A Multinational Registry
Analysis,” The Lancet (4 June 2020), online: <https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)313246> [https://perma.cc/B6WN-Y58T], retracting Mandeep R Mehra et al, “Hydroxychloroquine or
Chloroquine With or Without a Macrolide for Treatment of COVID-19: A Multinational Registry
Analysis,” The Lancet (22 May 2020), online: <https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)311806> [https://perma.cc/8F2A-BXK2]; see also The Lancet Editors, “Expression of Concern:
Hydroxychloroquine or Chloroquine With or Without a Macrolide for Treatment of COVID-19: A
Multinational Registry Analysis” The Lancet (3 June 2020), online: <https://doi.org/10.1016/S01406736(20)31290-3> [https://perma.cc/9QDB-5STN]. The authors also retracted an article in the
New England Journal of Medicine after similar expressions of concern: Mandeep R Mehra et al,
“Retraction: Cardiovascular Disease, Drug Therapy, and Mortality in Covid-19” (2020) 382:25 New
England Journal of Medicine, online: <https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMc2021225> [https://perma.cc/
X2EQ-K67T].
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journal editor called this “a shocking example of research misconduct
in the middle of a global health emergency.”23 This misplaced reliance
on academic research delayed the search for a COVID-19 treatment and
could undermine public trust in science.24
This example illustrates the double downside of reliance on research
that fails to live up to norms for responsible scholarship. If the failure is
exposed, public trust in scholarship can be eroded; and if it is not exposed,
people can make decisions based on bad information.25
II. Norms of responsible scholarship
The core values of responsible scholarship are honesty, fairness, trust,
accountability and openness.26 Scholars have “duties of honest and
thoughtful inquiry, rigorous analysis…and adherence to the use of
professional standards.”27 Canada’s three main research funding agencies
require researchers to “strive to follow the best research practices honestly,
accountably, openly and fairly in the search for and in the dissemination
of knowledge” and “follow the requirements of applicable institutional
policies and professional or disciplinary standards.”28 At a minimum,
this includes scholarly and scientific rigour in proposing, conducting
and publishing research, and accurate referencing of sources, theories,
concepts, methodologies, data and findings.29
University-level policies flesh out these norms. The Responsible
Conduct of Research Policy of the University of Saskatchewan, where the
author and publisher of the article discussed here are based, provides that
the “research, scholarly and artistic work of members of the University of
Saskatchewan must be held in the highest regard and be seen as rigorous

23. Sarah Boseley & Melissa Davey, “COVID-19: Lancet Retracts Paper that Halted
Hydroxychloroquine Trials,” The Guardian (4 June 2020), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2020/jun/04/covid-19-lancet-retracts-paper-that-halted-hydroxychloroquine-trials>
[https://
perma.cc/KT82-FCJJ].
24. Melissa Davey, “Retracted Studies may have Damaged Public Trust in Science, Top Researchers
Fear,” The Guardian (5 June 2020), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/jun/06/
retracted-studies-may-have-damaged-public-trust-in-science-top-researchers-fear>.
25. Ibid, quoting Professor Sharon Lewin, director of a research organization that suspended
hydroxychloroquine trials in reliance on the retracted study.
26. Council of Canadian Academies, Honesty, Accountability and Trust: Fostering Research Integrity
in Canada—The Expert Panel on Research Integrity (Ottawa: Council of Canadian Academies, 2010)
at 38.
27. Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council
of Canada & Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Tri-Agency Framework:
Responsible Conduct of Research (Ottawa: Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of Research, 2016), s
1.1 [Tri-Agency Framework].
28. Ibid, s 2.1.2.
29. Ibid.
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and scrupulously honest.”30 Members of the university are responsible
for “conducting their research, scholarly, and artistic work according to
the highest standards of research integrity,” “[e]xercising scholarly and
scientific rigour and integrity in recording, analyzing and interpreting
data, and in reporting and publishing data and findings.”31
Departures from these norms cover a spectrum, from minor to
egregious. The article we are considering here is not egregious, but it
departs enough from applicable norms to warrant a response.
Norms of responsible scholarship cover not just outright fabrication
and falsification, but also distortion of research materials or other scholars’
work that leads to inaccurate findings or conclusions.32 Responsible
research demands the “highest levels of exactitude” when “analyzing,
interpreting, reporting, publishing, and archiving research data and
findings.”33 Similarly, while slander and libel of other researchers represent
another extreme example of misconduct, belittlement and ad hominem
attacks against other researchers are also inconsistent with the principles
that everyone “directly affected or involved in research…should be treated
fairly and with respect”34 and that “evaluation of the work of others” should
be done “in a manner that reflects the highest scholarly, professional, and
scientific standards of fairness.”35
These norms arguably apply to a heightened degree to legal scholars,
who are more often than not members of a self-regulating profession that
has a mandate to serve the public interest.36
III. A case in point
Professor Dwight Newman’s article, “Federalism, Subsidiarity and
Carbon Taxes”37 departs from the norms of rigour and fairness in two
ways: first, by distorting the published work of scholars with whom he
disagrees, and portraying them in derogatory terms (see below, Part III30. University of Saskatchewan, Responsible Conduct of Research Policy (effective 1 July 2013),
s 2.0, online (pdf): <https://policies.usask.ca/documents/Responsible_Conduct_Research_Policy__
Procedures.pdf> [https://perma.cc/V6KV-L6DU].
31. Ibid, s 4.1, 4.1(d).
32. Ibid, s 5.0(b); Tri-Agency Framework, supra note 27, s 3.1.1.
33. Council of Canadian Academies, supra note 26 at 40.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid at 39. While this principle applies mainly to formal peer-review processes, we believe
fairness is also expected when evaluating others’ work in the context of scholarly publications.
36. While we focus on ethical responsibilities of legal scholars, practising lawyers’ reliance on
questionable academic research might implicate their professional responsibilities to clients, courts
and the public. Consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. See eg Michael J Saks &
Charles H Baron, eds, The Use/Nonuse/Misuse of Applied Social Research in the Courts (Cambridge,
Mass: Abt Books, 1980).
37. Newman, supra note 1.
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1); and second, by selectively presenting the relevant case law to suit his
purposes (see below, Part III-2). These failures undermine the credibility
of the article and have potential consequences for the adjudication of the
legality of the federal carbon pricing legislation. The article was cited six
times, all favourably, in the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision on the
legislation.38 At the Supreme Court, the Attorney General of Alberta, the
Attorney General of Quebec and the Canadian Taxpayers Federation cited
the article favourably seven times in their facta.39
Whatever the Supreme Court decides in the carbon pricing appeals, it
will likely consider Professor Newman’s article. Parties, interveners and
the Court—not to mention legal scholars and interested practitioners—
should be aware of the article’s shortcomings.
Let us be clear: we take no issue here with the substance of Professor
Newman’s criticism of the Saskatchewan and Ontario greenhouse gas
(GHG) pricing reference decisions, nor with his advocacy for the principle
of subsidiarity in Canadian constitutional interpretation. We do not intend
to enter the substantive debate about carbon pricing or the federal division
of powers in this short article. Instead, our concern is with how Professor
Newman chose to make his argument and the implications of this choice
for legal scholarship and informed public debate.
1. Fair treatment of other scholars and their work
Professor Newman’s article treats the scholars with whom he disagrees
unfairly by distorting their scholarly publications and using unsubstantiated
generalizations to discredit them. In particular, he distorts the work of
environmental law scholars Nathalie Chalifour and Jason MacLean. He
accuses Professor Chalifour of wishing that the problem of climate change
would change the Constitution. He supports this characterization by citing
the title of one of her articles, “Making Federalism Work for Climate
Change,” and claiming that her “recent focus has simply been to explicitly
urge judicial adaptation of the Constitution to ensure the implementation
of climate change policies.”40 This is a distortion of Professor Chalifour’s
work. Newman fails to engage at all, let alone in a rigorous or careful way,
with the argument in “Making Federalism Work.” He merely mentions its
title as if it were proof of a wish to change the Constitution. In fact, in this
and her other articles impugned by Professor Newman, Professor Chalifour
38. Alberta Reference, supra note 4.
39. SK (AG), supra note 5; ON (AG), supra note 5; BC(AG), supra note 5.
40. Newman, supra note 1 at 189, n 9 and accompanying text, citing Nathalie J Chalifour, “Making
Federalism Work for Climate Change: Canada’s Division of Powers over Carbon Taxes” (2008) 22:2
NJCL 119 [Chalifour, “Making Federalism Work”].
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relies on careful analysis of past constitutional decisions to argue that
regulation of GHG emissions falls within existing federal jurisdiction.41
To claim that she simply wishes to “change the Constitution” is a serious
distortion.
In the same passage, Professor Newman suggests that Professor
Chalifour’s work is incoherent insofar as it both criticizes carbon taxes
from a feminist perspective and defends the federal government’s
constitutional power to enact one. Newman complains that he has “not
identified in her later work any explanation of why she now exempts the
Trudeau government’s carbon tax policies from her prior demands for
gender analyses.”42
There is no contradiction here. It is perfectly coherent to criticize a law
on its merits while endorsing its constitutionality.43 Professor Chalifour
endorses a federal carbon tax even as she cautions that it must be designed
carefully to avoid placing an unfair burden on vulnerable groups.
In another passage, Professor Newman asserts that Professor Chalifour
has questioned the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction under the Peace, Order
and Good Government (POGG) clause “[f]or reasons that are not wholly
discernible.”44 On the contrary, a careful and fair reading of Professor
Chalifour’s work would have revealed that she explicates her reasoning
fully in an article in which she argues that her interpretation is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s recent tendency to prefer overlapping rather
than exclusive jurisdiction.45 One may disagree with her interpretation, but
it is misleading to suggest that her reasoning is not wholly discernible. To
imply that a scholar’s reasons are obscure when they are not is to impugn
unfairly the scholar’s intellectual rigour.
Newman’s treatment of the work of Professor Jason MacLean, his
junior untenured colleague at the University of Saskatchewan, is even
more problematic. He begins by claiming that Chalifour and MacLean
have “a tendency to write in overly narrow ways as if their central policy
concerns…must be the central object of legal planning at the expense
of all other policy considerations, principles, and human values.”46 This
41. See eg ibid; Nathalie J Chalifour, “Jurisdictional Wrangling over Climate Policy in the Canadian
Federation: Key Issues in the Provincial Constitutional Challenges to Parliament’s Greenhouse Gas
Pollution Pricing Act” (2019) 50:2 Ottawa L Rev 197 [Chalifour, “Jurisdictional Wrangling”].
42. Newman, supra note 1 at 189, n 9, citing Nathalie J Chalifour, “A Feminist Perspective on
Carbon Taxes” (2010) 21:1 CJWL 169.
43. See eg Guy Régimbald & Dwight Newman, The Law of the Canadian Constitution, 2nd ed
(Toronto: LexisNexis, 2017) at 188-190 (§§5.35-5.41).
44. Newman, supra note 1 at 196.
45. Chalifour, “Jurisdictional Wrangling,” supra note 41.
46. Newman, supra note 1 at 189.
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characterization is unfair and inaccurate. The only support Newman
provides for it is found in a footnote:
Thus, authors like MacLean develop arguments in which every institution
is corrupt and then the conclusion is that a party of academics must
guide all Canadian policy….That the implication embodies strong-form
elitism appears to generate no concern for someone focused entirely
on particular policy concerns over others. MacLean, of course, thinks
that his approaches are actually quite democratic, in so far as he regards
Canada as a “carbon democracy”—a sort of non-tropical form of banana
republic—and thinks that he offers a different democratic pathway….
But the readiness to condemn all Canadian institutions just manifests
a similar refusal to consider working from within the wisdom of longestablished institutions and principles.47

This passage is an unfair characterization of MacLean’s published work,
which cannot reasonably be interpreted as suggesting that every institution
is corrupt or that Canadian environmental law should be steered by a cabal
of academics. MacLean argues that regulatory capture by industry is the
root problem underlying Canadian environmental law and policy.48 This

47. Ibid, n 12, citing Jason MacLean, “Striking at the Root Problem of Canadian Environmental
Law: Identifying and Escaping Regulatory Capture” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 111 [MacLean,
“Striking at the Root Problem”]; and Jason MacLean, “Paris and Pipelines? Canada’s Climate Policy
Puzzle” (2018) 32:1 J Envtl L & Prac 47 [MacLean, “Paris and Pipelines”].
48. MacLean, “Striking at the Root Problem,” supra note 47; Jason MacLean, “Regulatory Capture
and the Role of Academics in Public Policymaking: Lessons from Canada’s Environmental Regulatory
Review Process” (2019) 52:2 UBC L Rev 479.
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proposition follows a long line of theoretical and empirical literature,49 and
he supports it with evidence.50
In the second article impugned by Newman, Professor MacLean
argues that Canada’s inconsistent embrace of both the Paris Agreement and
continued fossil fuel development can be explained by viewing Canada
as a “carbon democracy.”51 This argument is tailored to the conditions of
advanced industrial democracies, grounded in scholarly literature52 and
supported by evidence.53 To characterize it as treating Canada as a “nontropical form of banana republic” is inaccurate and unfairly dismissive.
To portray MacLean as arguing that “a party of academics must guide
all Canadian policy” is also unfair and inaccurate. MacLean writes:
Scholars across relevant disciplines must…collaborate on and
effectively communicate concrete alternative pathways, politicaleconomy trajectories away from oil and gas development towards
sustainability.…A particularly promising approach is to identify and
49. See eg George Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation” (1971) 2:1 Bell J Economics &
Management Sci 3; Michael E Levine & Jennifer L Forrence, “Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis” (1990) 6 JL Economics & Organization 167; Ian Ayres
& John Braithwaite, “Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment” (1991) 16:3 L & Soc
Inquiry 435; Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, “The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A
Theory of Regulatory Capture” (1991) 106:4 QJ Economics 1089; David R Boyd, Unnatural Law:
Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) at 251-256;
Ernesto Dal Bó, “Regulatory Capture: A Review” (2006) 22:2 Oxford Rev Economic Policy 203;
Daniel Carpenter & David A Moss, eds, Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence
and How to Limit It (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). In the context of environmental
regulation, see eg Sara Singleton, “Co-operation or Capture? The Paradox of Co-Management and
Community Participation in Natural Resource Management and Environmental Policy-Making”
(2000) 9:2 Environmental Politics 1; David B Spence, “The Shadow of the Rational Polluter:
Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law” (2001) 89:4 Cal L Rev 917;
Matthew D Zinn, “Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and
Citizen Suits” (2002) 21:1 Stan Envtl LJ 81; Mark S Winfield, “An Unimaginative People: Instrument
Choice in Canadian Law and Policy” (2008) 71:1 Sask L Rev 79 at 85-86; Michelle C Pautz, “NextGeneration Environmental Policy and the Implications for Environmental Inspectors: Are Fears of
Regulatory Capture Warranted?” (2010) 12:3 Environmental Practice 247; Stepan Wood, Georgia
Tanner & Benjamin J Richardson, “Whatever Happened to Canadian Environmental Law?” (2010)
37:4 Ecology LQ 981 at 988, 1013; David R Boyd, Cleaner, Greener, Healthier: A Prescription for
Stronger Canadian Environmental Laws and Policies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015) at 202-207;
Bruce Campbell, “Preconditions, Regulatory Failure, and Corporate Negligence Behind the LacMegantic Disaster” (2018) 48 RGD 95.
50. MacLean, “Striking at the Root Problem,” supra note 47 at 121-124.
51. MacLean, “Paris and Pipelines,” supra note 47.
52. The concept of “carbon democracy” was developed by political theorist Timothy Mitchell to
explain how leading industrialized states’ dependence on oil shapes their political dynamics: Timothy
Mitchell, ‘‘Carbon Democracy” (2009) 38:3 Economy & Society 399; Timothy Mitchell, Carbon
Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (New York: Verso, 2011).
53. In addition to marshalling his own evidence, MacLean cites Laurie Adkin’s work on the
dynamics of “carbon democracy” in the Canadian context: see eg Laurie E Adkin, ed, First World
Petro-Politics: The Political Ecology and Governance of Alberta (Toronto and Buffalo: University of
Toronto Press, 2016).
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communicate the tangible co-benefits of addressing climate change—
including economic development and enhanced community resilience.54

Far from advancing an undemocratic position, Professor MacLean links
engaged scholarship with an agenda for democratic renewal:
Communicating the co-benefits of addressing climate change can
encourage greater public attention and action, and thereby influence
government action….Importantly, …climate and sustainability policy
actions that clearly embody co-benefits…are capable of attracting
broad public support, which is the critical ingredient of a countervailing
democratic movement capable of displacing the outsized influence
of the oil and gas industry on policymaking in contemporary carbon
democracies like Canada.55

MacLean argues that the “very same mechanisms that created and
reproduced Alberta’s ‘petro-politics’—i.e. lobbying and industrygovernment partnerships, media campaigns, community engagement
initiatives, and not least, academic research—may be deployed to help
create a political economy based on renewable energy and community
resilience.”56 “Accordingly,” he concludes, “sustainability advocates and
scholars must do more to show how a post-carbon democracy can work
in practice.”57 MacLean’s argument is consistent with widely accepted
approaches to the mobilization of scholarly knowledge.58 It is unfair to
portray it as undemocratic and embodying “strong-form elitism.”59
Professor Newman also distorts statements made by Professors
Chalifour and MacLean in popular media. He claims, for example, that an
article they wrote in Policy Options refers to litigation challenging climate
change policies as “bicker[ing] and navel-gaz[ing].”60 On the contrary,
their reference to “bicker[ing] and navel-gaz[ing]” was a collective selfcritique directed at all Canadians, not at litigants opposing a carbon tax, as
Newman implies.61

54. MacLean, “Paris and Pipelines,” supra note 47 at 72.
55. Ibid at 73.
56. Ibid at 73-74.
57. Ibid at 74.
58. See eg Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, “Guidelines for Effective
Knowledge Mobilization” (last modified 17 June 2019), online: Government of Canada <https://www.
sshrc-crsh.gc.ca/funding-financement/policies-politiques/knowledge_mobilisation-mobilisation_des_
connaissances-eng.aspx> [https://perma.cc/LH6D-292T].
59. Newman, supra note 1 at 189, n 12.
60. Ibid at 187.
61. Nathalie Chalifour & Jason MacLean, “Courts Should Not Have to Decide Climate Change
Policy,” Policy Options (21 December 2018), online: <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/
december-2018/courts-not-decide-climate-change-policy/> [https://perma.cc/47XE-WHWT].
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These distortions of his opponents’ published work exhibit unfair
treatment of other scholars and their work and a lack of scholarly care
and rigour. Professor Newman’s article also resorts to unsubstantiated
generalizations to discredit his interlocutors. The article disparages his
perceived opponents as “these sorts of environmental law academics,”62
“environmental advocates like Chalifour and MacLean,”63 “authors like
MacLean,”64 and people who “are inclined to mock” Saskatchewan’s
decision to challenge the federal carbon price and who “neglect deep
underlying values that have shaped the Canadian Constitution and the life
of human communities that the Constitution has enabled.”65 These casual
generalizations are examples of sloppy research, insofar as Newman fails
to identify anyone other than Chalifour and MacLean who allegedly falls
into these categories. They also compound the article’s unfair treatment of
these scholars and their work.
2. Fair treatment of the relevant case law
Professor Newman bolsters his attack on Professors Chalifour and
MacLean with a selective and self-serving portrayal of the case law at the
centre of the dispute. He does this in two ways: by exaggerating the degree
of division amongst the judges in the Saskatchewan and Ontario reference
cases, and by presenting a blinkered view of the case law on the POGG
power.
First, he writes that the seven judges in the Ontario and Saskatchewan
reference cases who would uphold the federal legislation “are split among
three different—and not entirely consistent—explanations of the legal
basis for federal jurisdiction, meaning there is as strong a combined vote
for the unconstitutionality of the legislation as for any single explanation
of its constitutionality.”66
There are two problems with this claim: it exaggerates the disagreement
amongst the judges and it compares apples and oranges. The three-judge
majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal characterized the pith and substance
of the legislation as “establishing minimum national standards to reduce
GHG emissions.”67 The three-judge majority of the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal characterized it as “establishing minimum national standards
of price stringency for GHG emissions,”68 while the concurring judge in
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Newman, supra note 1 at 188.
Ibid at 189.
Ibid at 189, n 12.
Ibid at 190.
Ibid at 188.
Ontario Reference, supra note 3 at para 114, Strathy CJO.
Saskatchewan Reference, supra note 3 at para 158, Richards CJS.
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Ontario characterized it as “establishing minimum national greenhouse
gas emissions pricing standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”69
Professor Newman asserts that “there are differing levels of breadth” and
“even explicit clashes” between these three characterizations and promises
to “return later in the article to consider these distinctions further.”70
The article does later discuss several of the characterizations proffered
by parties and interveners, but nowhere does it directly compare the
characterizations offered by these seven judges. The “pith and substance”
characterizations of the Saskatchewan three-judge majority and one
Ontario concurring judge amount to the same thing: setting minimum
national GHG pricing standards. Any distinction between “establishing
minimum national standards of price stringency for GHG emissions”
and “establishing minimum national greenhouse gas emissions pricing
standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” is fine if there is one at all.
And while the difference between setting minimum national GHG pricing
standards and the Ontario majority’s “minimum national standards for
GHG emissions reductions” is real, these seven judges were not far apart
on this point compared to the wide range of characterizations proffered
by parties and interveners. Moreover, all seven agreed that the legislation
was a valid exercise of the national concern branch of the POGG power. If
anything, Professor Newman acknowledges the similarity amongst these
opinions when he writes “the majority judges have ended up accepting
characterizations focused on the setting of a national minimum price” on
carbon emissions.71
Our point is not to pick apart the fine points of these cases or of
Professor Newman’s argument. Rather, it is that by asserting that these
opinions present three different and partly inconsistent explanations of
the constitutionality of federal carbon pricing legislation without actually
comparing and contrasting those explanations, the article is not fair to the
judicial decisions under consideration.
The second problem with the claim that there is “as strong a
combined vote for unconstitutionality as for any single explanation
of its constitutionality” is that it conflates apples with oranges. Votes
for unconstitutionality are votes for a particular conclusion. Votes for
explanations of constitutionality are votes for a particular path to a
conclusion. A conclusion and a path to a conclusion are different things.
The fact that cases before appellate courts are heard by multiple judges
69.
70.
71.

Ontario Reference, supra note 3 at para 114, Hoy ACJO.
Newman, supra note 1 at 188, n 6.
Ibid at 198-199.
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means that the number of paths can exceed the number of conclusions.
The reverse is impossible if the conclusion in question is a binary choice,
as it is here (constitutional or unconstitutional). In such a case the number
of conclusions can equal but not exceed the number of explanations.
Therefore, to compare the number of votes for or against a law’s
constitutionality with the number of votes for any particular explanation
of its constitutionality or unconstitutionality is not very informative and
risks giving a false impression of the strength of opposition to the federal
carbon pricing legislation in these two decisions.
Another way in which the article is not scrupulously fair to the legal
materials is that it presents a partial and blinkered account of the POGG
case law. Professor Newman claims that “the case law does not support
the three-branch description of [the POGG power] often cheerily offered
by those who would centralize the federation.”72 He is right that the courts
have construed this branch narrowly and have rarely invoked it to uphold
federal legislation. He may be right to suggest that the Supreme Court’s
consideration of the federal carbon price references will be “an occasion to
sort out what branches actually exist on the POGG power,” and that “there
are real arguments for considering [the national concern branch’s] legal
status suspect.”73 But he supports the latter claim by painting a selective
picture of the national concern jurisprudence.
First, Professor Newman suggests that the national concern branch has
only been used to uphold federal legislation once, in Crown Zellerbach,74
and that the judges in that case created it “out of whole cloth” merely
because they “thought they needed it.”75 This claim is not substantiated.
First, Newman gives no reason for rejecting the two other Supreme Court
decisions that are commonly cited as upholding federal legislation under
the national concern branch,76 other than to allege that some unidentified
scholars consider them to fall under the “gap” branch.77
Second, his criterion for judging the doctrine’s existence is unduly
demanding: the number of cases in which federal legislation has been
upheld by the Supreme Court solely and explicitly on this basis. He does
not acknowledge that the branch’s existence might also be determined by

72. Ibid at 201.
73. Ibid at 196, n 47.
74. R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd, [1988] 1 SCR 401, 49 DLR (4th) 161.
75. Newman, supra note 1 at 196, n 47 and accompanying text.
76. See eg Chalifour, “Making Federalism Work,” supra note 41 at 179, citing Johannesson v West
St Paul (Rural Municipality), [1952] 1 SCR 292, [1951] 4 DLR 609 (aeronautics); Munro v National
Capital Commission, [1966] SCR 663, 57 DLR (2d) 753 (National Capital Region).
77. Newman, supra note 1 at 196, n 47.
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the number of cases in which the Supreme Court and other courts have
classified matters as falling within the national concern branch even if they
did not uphold federal legislation on this basis;78 and cases in which courts
have said the branch exists.79 These cases date back at least to 1946,80
and possibly much earlier. To claim that the Supreme Court invented the
branch “out of whole cloth” in Crown Zellerbach, and that “the case law
does not support the three-branch description of the POGG power,”81
downplays this judicial history.
The existence of the three branches of the POGG power is accepted by
Canadian courts and commentators. Professor Newman’s own co-authored
constitutional law treatise makes no suggestion that the national concern
branch does not exist, nor that it was invented in 1988.82 As the late doyen
of Canadian constitutional law, Peter Hogg, wrote, “The national concern
branch of p.o.g.g. has been recognized in many cases since 1946” and
“The cumulative effect of these cases is to establish firmly the national
concern branch of p.o.g.g.”83
We have no problem with Professor Newman claiming that the
national concern branch does not exist; what we object to is his doing so
without giving fair consideration to the decades of case law and scholarly
commentary that point in the opposite direction.
Conclusion
Professor Newman’s article is not an egregious case, but it crosses a line
that separates distortion and disparagement from constructive scholarly
debate. The problems we have documented deserve to be aired so that
parties and courts do not misplace their reliance on the article in making
decisions about the carbon pricing reference cases.
A rigorous peer review process would normally catch most problems
like the ones we have identified with this article.84 Journal editors may
78. See eg Ontario Hydro v Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 SCR 327, 107 DLR (4th)
457; Pronto Uranium Mines Ltd v Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1956] OR 862, 5 DLR (2d) 342
(atomic energy).
79. Examples from the Supreme Court include Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act, 1975, [1976] 2 SCR
373, 68 DLR (3d) 452; Labatt Breweries v Canada (AG), [1980] 1 SCR 914, 110 DLR (3d) 594;
Schneider v British Columbia, [1982] 2 SCR 112, 139 DLR (3d) 417; RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada
(AG), [1994] 1 SCR 311, 111 DLR (4th) 385; RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199, 127
DLR (4th) 1; R v Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 SCR 213, 151 DLR (4th) 32; R v Malmo-Levine, [2003] 3
SCR 571, 233 DLR (4th) 415.
80. Ontario (AG) v Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] AC 193, [1946] 2 DLR 1 (PC).
81. Newman, supra note 1 at 196, n 47 and 201.
82. Régimbald & Newman, supra note 43 at 232-238 (§§6.15-6.30).
83. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2017 student ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters,
2017) at 17.11-17.12 (§17.3(a)).
84. In December 2019 and again in June and July 2020, we asked the Saskatchewan Law Review if
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feel pressure to dispense with or rush review processes to maximize
the relevance and exposure of articles addressing time-sensitive issues
like the carbon pricing references or the COVID-19 pandemic. The
retracted hydroxychloroquine article we mentioned earlier was published
approximately one month after submission, a very short time to complete a
thorough peer review. Journals should strive to make timely contributions
to discourse on pressing public issues, but not at the expense of norms of
responsible scholarship.
Vigorous debate and disagreement are the lifeblood of academic
discourse and the engine for advancement of knowledge. To insist on
rigour and fairness in such debate is not to impose “political correctness”
on scholars who espouse unpopular views. Nor is it a manifestation of the
fragility of a liberal academic establishment unable to handle controversial
perspectives. It is necessary to enable constructive scholarly debate and to
maintain public trust in academic expertise.
We have no doubt that constructive scholarly debate on climate
change, carbon pricing, division of powers, the national concern branch,
subsidiarity, regulatory capture and the role of academics in a democracy
is possible. To be clear, our purpose in this article is not to take a position in
those debates. This article is intended neither as a critique of the substance
of Professor Newman’s position on those issues, nor as a defence of those of
Professors Chalifour and MacLean. If we defend their work here, it is only
to the extent necessary to substantiate our claim that Professor Newman’s
article does not uphold standards of scrupulous fairness in scholarly
research. We offer this article as a reminder of mutual expectations for
responsible scholarship and look forward to the continuation of vigorous,
constructive and publicly-beneficial scholarly debate on these important
issues.

Professor Newman’s article was peer reviewed. We did not receive an answer.
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